2019-10-30 君子冲盈 21581
原创翻译:龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.com 翻译:君子冲盈 转载请注明出处

While it has become nearly axiomatic for observers of world affairs to contend that the U.S.-led postwar order is under growing, if not unprecedented, duress, there is little consensus about what architecture, if any, might replace it. A recent assessment ventures that the successor to the global system of governance we have known since the Second World War [may be] not another order but the absence of one. It is possible that the world, squeezed between the incompatible visions of a retreating U.S. and a resurgent China, is already hurtling toward chaos.

虽然对于世界事务观察家来说,美国领导的战后秩序即使不是史无前例的,也是日益增长的,这已经成为几乎不言而喻的事实,但对于什么样的架构( 如果有的话) 可能取代它,人们几乎没有达成共识。

There is also growing concern about the mobilization of disintegrationist elements within Europe. In a speech in April last year, French president Emmanuel Macron warned that “a sort of European civil war is reappearing,” observing that “our differences, sometimes our national egoisms, appear more important than what unites us in relation to the rest of the world.” Even more ominously, he concluded that a “fascination with illiberalism…is growing by the day.” Examples of that fascination abound. Italy’s interior minister has called for a census of the country’s Roma population. Austria’s chancellor has urged his country to form an “axis of the willing against illegal migration” with Germany and Italy. In a multifaceted effort to limit George Soros’ influence, Hungary has forced the closure of Central European University, a prestigious Budapest-based institution funded by the philanthropist; pressured the Open Society Foundation until Soros declared that its Budapest operations were no longer safe; and passed a “Stop Soros” law that effectively criminalizes efforts to provide humanitarian aid and legal assistance to undocumented immigrants. The country’s prime minister has declared that: “Rather than try to fix a liberal democracy that has run aground, we will build a 21st-century Christian democracy.”

在去年4月的一次演讲中,法国总统埃马纽埃尔 · 马克龙警告称,“欧洲内战正在复演”。
他指出,“我们的分歧,有时我们的民族利己主义,似乎比我们与世界其他国家的联系更为复要。” 更不祥的是,他的结论是“对非自由主义的迷恋... ... 与日俱增。” 这种迷恋的例子比比皆是。
为了限制乔治 · 索罗斯的影响力,匈牙利尝试了多方面的努力,迫使中欧大学关闭,这是一所总部设在布达佩斯的著名机构,由慈善家提供资金,匈牙利向开放社会基金会施压,直来索罗斯宣布布达佩斯的业务不再安全,并通过了一项”禁止索罗斯”的法律,该法律实际上将向非法移民提供人道主义援助和法律援助的行为定为刑事犯罪,该国总理宣称: “与其试图修复搁浅的自由民主,我们不如建立一个21世纪的基督教民主。”

Some perspective is in order. The first half of the twentieth century witnessed a sufficiently confident and widespread authoritarian ascent that, according to political theorist John Keane, only eleven electoral democracies remained by 1941. Franklin Roosevelt warned in a speech in March of that year that the United States would have to furnish “fuel in ever-increasing amounts” to safeguard “the great flame of democracy from the blackout of barbarism.” Today there are 116 electoral democracies—down from 120 two decades ago, concerningly, but still an impressive number.

有一些观点是恰当的, 二十世纪上半叶我们见证了一个充满自信和广泛传播的威权主义国家崛起,根据政治理论家 John Keane 的说法,来1941年只剩下十一个选举民主国家。
富兰克林·德拉诺·罗斯福在当年3月的一次演讲中警告说,美国将不得不提供“越来越多的燃料” ,以保护“民主的伟大火焰免遭野蛮时代的熄灭” ,令人担忧的是,如今只有116个选举民主国家,比20年前的120个有所下降,当然,这仍旧是一个令人印象深刻的数字。

It would be premature to suggest, however, that globalization is reversing. The World Bank reports that “net capital inflows [into developing countries] entered positive territory in 2017, following two years of large contractions”—a development that “has been facilitated by the improving economic outlook in several large emerging economies.” There are hopeful signs on trade flows as well. Consider an oft-cited gauge of globalization, the ratio between the growth rate of world merchandise trade and that of real gross world product. Historically hovering at 1.5, it fell to an average of 1.0 between 2011 and 2016; in 2017, however, it rebounded to 1.5. The World Trade Organization (WTO) forecast last April that trade would grow at 4.4 percent in 2018 and 4 percent this year, compared to the post-crisis average of three percent.

世界银行报告称,“(流入发展中国家的) 净资本在连续两年大幅收缩之后,于2017年进入正值水平”——这一发展趋势“得益于几个大型新兴经济体经济前景的改善” ,在贸易流动方面也出现了令人鼓励的迹象。
世界贸易组织去年4月猜测,2018年和今年的贸易额将分别增长4.4% 和4% ,而危机后的平均增长率为3% 。

Continued progress on bilateral and regional trade deals suggests that this pace may endure. Eleven of the twelve countries that were negotiating a Trans-Pacific Partnership have finalized the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, covering some 13.5 percent of gross world product (GWP). Japan and the European unx (eu) have signed a bilateral trade agreement, the world’s largest, that accounts for roughly 30 percent of GWP. Negotiations are also inching forward on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a sixteen-country arrangement that, too, would incorporate some 30 percent of GWP.

正在谈判《跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》的12个国家最终达成了《跨太平洋伙伴关系全面进步协定》,涵盖了全球生产总值 (GWP) 的13.5%。
日本和欧盟签署了一项双边贸易协定,这是世界上最大的贸易协定,约占全球生产总值的30% 。
关于区域全面经济伙伴关系的谈判也在缓慢向前推进,这是一个由16个国家组成的协议,也将纳入约30% 的全球生产总值。

The third reason some observers see parallels with the 1930s—and also, incidentally, with the Cold War—is the return of great power competition, with Russia and China occupying center stage. But neither country is posing a frontal assault on the postwar order; the former is opportunistically obstructive, while the latter is sextively revisionist. Moscow is continuously challenged by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to its west and increasingly dependent on China to its east. Beijing’s ambitions, meanwhile, are constrained not only by an increasingly apprehensive Washington but also by strong powers in Canberra, Delhi, Seoul and Tokyo that seek to forestall the resumption of a Sinocentric hierarchy in the Asia-Pacific. While the current order is undoubtedly under strain, there is at least an order to defend. Today, moreover, despite the present vagaries in its foreign policy, the United States is the world’s lone superpower; in the 1930s, by contrast, despite commanding the world’s largest economy, Washington’s military and diplomatic influence beyond its borders lagged far behind its industrial heft.


Perhaps even more common is the suggestion that the United States is entering into a new Cold War. There is little agreement on the antagonist in this alleged confrontation: some say that it is Russia; others, China; yet others, a Sino-Russian authoritarian axis; and even some, the menace of terrorism, in its ever-changing structure and roster of outfits. That this number of actors can be characterized as America’s putative opponent in a new Cold War suggests an intrinsic limitation to the analogy.

有人说是俄罗斯,有人说是中国,还有人说是中俄威权轴心, 甚至还有人说是恐惧主义的威逼,其结构和组织名单不断在变化。

To speak of a new Cold War is to suggest not only that the United States once more confronts a rival power with ambitions of global dominance and pretensions to a universal ideology, but also that that power can and will employ territorial aggression, proxy warfare and client states across the world in the service of its strategic obxtives. Neither of the two supposed antagonists in this sequel, though, would seem to fit this descxtion.


Russia is undoubtedly a major power, commanding the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, the world’s largest proven reserves of natural gas and a veto on the United Nations Security Council. But it is a pale shadow of the Soviet unx, which, upon dissolving, yielded Russia and fourteen post-Soviet republics, three of which—Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia—now belong to NATO. Russia’s population is slated to decline from roughly 144 million today to 133 million by 2050, a nearly 8 percent drop. Its energy leverage in Europe, while significant, is far less than it was at the end of the Cold War; where Moscow accounted for three-quarters of the EU’s gas imports in 1990, it now accounts for under two-fifths.

估量来2050年,俄罗斯人口将从现在的大约1.44亿下降来1.33亿,降幅接近8% 。

China’s economic progress is arguably of even greater concern to the United States. Beijing is on track to displace Washington in absolute economic size well before the middle of this century. It appears intent on constructing and anchoring an expansive Eurasian economic order, especially as seen with its work on the Belt and Road (BRI) initiative. Having been included in the International Monetary Fund’s basket of special drawing rights, the renminbi is embarking on a slow but concerted push to become a global reserve currency. Finally, Beijing is taking significant steps to boost its indigenous economic capacity; its spending on research and development increased over thirty-fold between 1995 and 2013, and the government recently announced a strategy that aims to have China become the world’s foremost leader in artificial intelligence by 2030. There is also an appreciable risk that growing trade tensions between Washington and Beijing could yield security ones; the United States increasingly regards China’s technological ambitions as a threat to its national security, while China believes that its existing degree of economic dependence on the U.S. economy gives the United States an unacceptable measure of leverage over its economy. Given that trade interdependence has been one of the few restraints to date on their competition, an erosion of that connective tissue could thrust their relationship into a far more uncertain, potentially escalatory, phase.


Finally, an erstwhile muted ideological component of U.S.-China relations is acquiring more salience. The Chinese Communist Party’s move to end presidential term limits means that President Xi could well rule over China for as long as he lives. His policies to date suggest that Beijing’s increasing integration into the global economy, far from inducing it to temper its domestic illiberalism, has made it more confident in its authoritarianism. At the first session of the 13th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, he called Chinese governance “a great contribution to political civilization of humanity” and argued that democratic governance, “confined by interests of different political parties, classes, regions, and groups, tears society apart.” In “Document 9,” moreover, issued in April 2013, senior Party leaders warned that China had to counter “Western forces hostile to China,” including the promulgation of “constitutional democracy” and “universal values” of human rights. China is also becoming more aggressive in its crackdown on political dissidents and ethnic minorities.
In the aggregate, then, while most U.S. observers continue to emphasize both the competitive and cooperative elements of U.S.-China relations, they increasingly fear that the former are overtaking the latter.

在中国人民政治协商会议第十三届全国委员会第一次会议上,他称中国的治理是“对人类政治文明的伟大奉献” ,并认为民主治理“受不同政党、阶级、地区、团体利益的限制,会撕裂社会”
此外,在2013年4月发布的《9号文件》中,党的高级领导人警告说,中国必须打击“西方敌视中国的势力” ,包括颁布“宪政民主”和人权的“普世价值观”。

Still, it is a leap too far to conclude that the United States is in a new Cold War with China. America’s confrontation with the Soviet unx spanned the entire world; today, however, Washington is the lone superpower, while Beijing remains a regional power, albeit one with an increasingly global footprint. Middle powers have far more room to benefit from U.S.-China rivalry than they did from U.S.-Soviet rivalry: they can increase their diplomatic and security ties with the United States while boosting their trade and investment relations with China. Beijing is not undertaking to export revolutionary ideology in the way that Moscow did. The United States and China have also achieved an extraordinary level of economic interdependence over the past four decades, and especially since China’s accession to the WTO in 2001. In addition, notes the Brookings Institution’s Cheng Li, even as the two countries become increasingly suspicious of one another’s strategic intentions, contact between the two nations has never been broader, deeper, and more frequent than it is today—whether it be at the head of state, military, think tank, sub-national, commercial, educational, cultural, or tourism level.


Because the core of U.S.-China rivalry is economic and technological, not militaristic and ideological, there is greater room for pragmatic cooperation.
China recognizes that the Soviet unx erred by launching a frontal military and ideological assault on the prevailing order; it is more likely to develop its global footprint by building infrastructure than by deploying its armed forces or attempting to inculcate its ideology in distant countries. While it is pressing for greater reforms within the current system and developing a parallel architecture on the outside, it is not agitating for the system’s collapse. There is also little evidence thus far that China seeks to be a superpower in the U.S. mold.


While skeptical observers might not be as sanguine, China has real, increasingly manifest vulnerabilities at home and abroad. Protracted trade tensions with the United States have exposed frailties in Beijing’s economy, beginning with its gross debt, which grew from 171 percent of gross domestic product in the first quarter of 2008 to 299 percent in the first quarter of 2018. A confluence of phenomena—the aforementioned trade tensions, the recent collapse of a wave of peer-to-peer lending schemes, a grim demographic outlook and a scandal over tainted vaccines, among them—has dented the halo of invincibility around Xi’s rule.

与美国长期的贸易紧张关系暴露了北京经济的脆弱性,第一是其总债务,从2008年第一季度占国内生产总值的171% 增长来2018年第一季度的299% 。
一系列的现象---- 前面提来的贸易紧张局势,最近一波网络借贷公司的崩溃,严肃的人口前景和污染疫苗的丑闻---- 已经削弱了环绕X统治的不可战胜的光环。

Abroad, the BRI is encountering growing pushback, with a striking recent example coming from Malaysia. Announcing that he was canceling two Chinese-funded projects worth some $22 billion, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad declared: “We do not want a situation where there is a new version of colonialism happening because poor countries are unable to compete with rich countries.” While Taiwan continues to lose formal recognition, China has been unable to subdue its ambitions for independence; nor, as noted by Michal Thim of the Prague-based Association for International Affairs, has it been able to disrupt Taipei’s “extensive global engagement, including significant relationships with the United States, Europe and Japan.” Finally, its authoritarianism is coming under harsher scrutiny, with numerous reports detailing the intrusiveness of its surveillance apparatus and its widespread detainment of Uighurs.

我们不期望出现新的殖民主义,因为贫穷国家无法与宽裕国家竞争 。
尽管台湾在连续失去其它国家对它的正式承认,但中国一直未能遏制其独立野心,正如总部位于布拉格的国际事务协会的米哈尔 · 泰姆所指出的,中国也未能破坏台北“广泛的全球接触,包括与美国、欧洲和日本的复要关系” 。

If it is wrong to portray Russia as an aggrieved Eurasian player whose influence is sextive and constrained, it is at least as unhelpful to characterize it as a resurgent global power whose influence is wide-ranging and ubiquitous. And if it is misguided to depict China as a fatally hubristic upstart, it cannot be constructive to imagine it an inexorably ascendant colossus. U.S. foreign policy would be better served by adopting more nuanced assessments of the Russian and Chinese challenges than by oscillating between these exaggerations: neither reflexive complacency nor indefinite consternation will enable U.S. competitiveness over the long term.


In contending with Russia, America’s challenge is three-fold: to preserve a baseline of cooperation where vital U.S. national interests are at stake, to mitigate the irredentist tendencies of a country that waxes nostalgic for its imperial predecessors and to restore a sense of national cohesion that can resist external subversion. Whether the United States meets the China challenge over the long term, meanwhile, will depend on a number of factors: the durability of its economic growth; its ability to remain at the forefront of scientific and technological innovation; its creativity in conducting geo-economic diplomacy, especially in the Asia-Pacific; and its success in persuading long-standing allies that their national interests would be better served by helping to revitalize the postwar order than by conceding its erosion. China is a more nuanced, incremental competitor than the Soviet unx—and, for that reason, a more challenging one.


The absence of a decided foe has contributed to the lack of strategic discipline in U.S. foreign policy over the past quarter-century, and especially in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Some in Washington increasingly appears to have accepted the prospect of interminable war in the Middle East, a resignation that, if not revisited, could impose a permanent constraint on its ability to compete with China in the Asia-Pacific. The United States has now been in Afghanistan for more than seventeen years, and though it has made little to no net progress in reducing the Taliban’s share of territory in that country, there is growing controversy on whether it intends to extricate itself. The war in Iraq, meanwhile, is well over fifteen years old, and the United States still has some 5,200 troops there—plus another 2,000 or so in Syria—to prevent the reemergence of the Islamic State.


If the world is neither revisiting the interwar period nor embarking on a sequel to the Cold War, where exactly is it heading? There is no shortage of answers: a new era of U.S. preeminence, Chinese preeminence, a U.S.-China “G2,” multipolarity, regional spheres of influence, nonpolarity and a vacuum in order are just a few that observers have offered. Perhaps the most accurate answer is also the most banal: it is hard to say. While the postwar order is eroding, there is no readily apparent replacement in the offing. The National Intelligence Council posits that “[t]he net effect of rising tensions within and between countries—and the growing threat from terrorism—will be greater global disorder and considerable questions about the rules, institutions, and distribution of power in the international system.”


Perhaps the biggest question involves the role of the United States. In the 1930s it was an emerging power in a world without a clearly defined order. During the Cold War it was one pole of a generally bipolar order. There was a fleeting, roughly seventeen-year period between the end of the Cold War and the onset of the global financial crisis in which, possessing a level of preeminence that it is unlikely to ever reclaim, it proactively sought to diffuse the norms and bolster the institutions it established at the outset of the postwar era. Between the downturn and the inauguration of President Donald Trump, an even shorter interval, it tried to adapt the order in view of the grievances, capabilities and ambitions of core emerging powers. Today, however, under the Trump administration, the United States is both a central pillar of today’s order and one of its principal challengers—a duality whose oddity is difficult to overstate.

从经济低迷来唐纳德 · 特朗普就职,间隔时间更短,中国试图根据核心新兴大国的不满、能力和野心来调整秩序。
然而,今天,在特朗普政府的领导下,美国既是当今秩序的核心支柱,也是它的主要挑战者之一 ——这是一种很难夸大其词的双复性。

A degree of such ambiguity invariably inheres in any administration’s foreign policy: top officials neither publicize all of their internal debates nor telegraph every instance in which there may be gaps between America’s declared and actual policies on a given issue. Countries expend enormous effort—parsing official government documents, conducting private diplomacy, producing intelligence assessments and so forth—trying to discern others’ intentions. But execution matters more than intent: while Trump has rightly interrogated the nature and scope of America’s involvement in the postwar order, such is the momentum that often accompanies fundamental recalibrations that it risks producing overreaction. The continuation of an “America First” policy will compel long-standing allies to be more proactive in fashioning arrangements and institutions that circumvent America’s reach; consider, for example, the German foreign minister’s call for a new payments system independent of Washington, the aforementioned Japan-EU free trade deal, the establishment of an EU-China-working group that will consider how to upxe the WTO and growing coordination between the EUand China to write the rules that will govern global internet policy. A United States that is increasingly alone will be increasingly incapable of advancing its national interests.

原创翻译:龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.com 翻译:君子冲盈 转载请注明出处

I don''t see any danger of the US falling behind Russia or China--unless the rot from within destroys its will. Fake news bleats dire warnings of ''authoritarianism'', and a rise of the right, but this masks the true nature of the conflict. The authoritarianism of the far-left, and the imposition of their disastrous immigration, social, and economic policies are the cause of revolt in Western nations. The MSM itself is one of the ''authoritarian'' powers which the common people are rebelling against. The far-left''s narrative of right wing extremism is merely a projection of their own failed extremist policies. Nationalist groups only wish to regain their economic and cultural sovereignty from the global elites.
On a conventional military level, Russia has no chance against the US. Russia has an economy smaller than that of Texas, and it only garners respect due to its large nuclear arsenal. When Russia split from the Ukraine, they lost a lot of technical know-how in key military industries. Without oil and gas, Russia could not even afford to be a player on the world stage.
China is the greatest threat to the US, but China''s military power has been greatly exaggerated. The quality of China''s weapons, and the professionalism of the corrupt PLA is highly suspect. But the Pentagon and the MIC like bigging up the threat of China since it opens the doors for additional military funding.
The F-35 program is only now ramping up to full production, and very soon thousands of F-35s will be flown by the US and its allies around the world. This alone guarantees US air supremacy in any future conflict. Prototypes of the non-stealthy J-20s and Su-57s number less than 20 each, and there is little chance either aircraft will be mass-produced soon. Putin has essentially put the Su-57 on the back burner due to cost and development problems, and China still cannot manufacture an engine with suitable power for the J-20. A Chinese jet engine not only requires constant maintenance, but it is lucky to last even half the life of a comparable US engine. This is expensive for the Chinese in maintenance dollars and in readiness.
The F-35 is but one of many US military technological advances which put the US far ahead of the competition. Lasers, particle beams, rail guns, and guided hyper velocity projectiles promise a level up in US capabilities in the very near future. There are multiple innovative weapons systems being currently developed which will only add to US military dominance.
The long-term military dominance of the US is tied to its economic dominance. This economic prosperity allows for the wealth to fuel the vast military industrial complex and the innovation which it produces. China can steal some tech, but it will always be behind the US if it depends upon IP theft instead of innovation. As long as the US adheres to free-market economic principles, and stays away from excesses in social spending, its economy will remain dominant, and so will its military.
Besides, China''s economy is not doing so well, and at some point, the inefficiencies and corruption of the Communist command economy will self-destruct. The Communists control all the information metrics for the Chinese economy, and these have lied for a long time, hiding the massive debts incurred by shadow banking, inefficient state run companies, and municipal borrowing. Did I mention corruption? Corruption runs like a rot all throughout the Chinese economy. China has been prosecuting an economic war against the West for decades now, but Trump, the only politician who recognized this, is taking corrective action. This does not bode well for the Chinese economy long-term. All those starry-eyed projections of China overtaking the US economy are premature.
Alone, the US can out compete both Russia and China, but when the US allies are added to the strategic mix, it becomes no contest for Russia and China.
Much of the uneasiness of the pundits in the main stream media stems from the fact that their far-left agenda is under assault, and all of the corrupt politicians they have maintained in power are now recognized for the traitors and criminals they are. These crooks have yet to be purged from political power, but purged they will be. Globalism has proved to be only elitism in disguise, and social justice and social democracy are a Trojan Horse for far-left authoritarianism which destroys the morals, economies, cultures, and identities of nations.

我看不来美国有落后于俄罗斯或中国的危险——除非来自内部的腐败摧残了美国的意志。 假新闻掩盖了威权主义组织和右翼势力崛起的可怕警告,但这掩盖了冲突的真实本质。

俄罗斯的经济规模小于德克萨斯州,由于其庞大的核武库,俄罗斯赢得的仅仅是人们的尊敬。 当俄罗斯从乌克兰分离出去的时候,他们失去了许多关键军事技术。


how US is #1, russia is far more powerful than that, russia nukes is more powerful, and since nukes have more damage than anything else, let''s just say that russia is more powerful


life form
I think the author too much overlooks the world besides the US, China and Russia.
Sure the relative dominance/ pre-eminence of the US declines, as the rest of the world recovered from WW1 and 2.
And China and Russia had to recover from their own self inflicted wounds.
But no mention of the EU? That''s a big society! India? South Asia, Oceania, the South Americas..those are growing quickly.. Japan...still a powerful nation, Africa grows quickly...
The US''s historically brief lone superpower status was somewhat of a historical freak, a confluence of a fine geographical endowment (large coastlines on both major oceans, protection from invasion by said oceans, lots of fertile land and fresh water,) a better than many political system, an extensive university system and advanced tech and industrial capacity, last man standing after WW2, etc.
But as the population of the world has doubled in my lifetime, and other parts of the world develop, the new world is/will be a more and more crowded, multi polar place.

但是没有提来欧盟? 这是一个大社会! 印度呢? 南亚,大洋洲,南美洲。。它们成长得很快。。 日本仍旧是一个强大的国家,非洲发展迅速..。
美国历史上短暂而孤独的超级大国地位,在某种程度上是一个历史怪物,优良的地理禀赋 ( 保护免受上述海洋入侵的两个主要海洋的巨大海岸线,大量肥沃的土地和淡水),比大多数国家更好的政治制度,广泛的大学体系和先进的技术和工业能力,二战后两极相持唯一的赢家,等等。

Bill Robbins
The world does not seek-out or emulate Chinese culture. Nor does the world want Russian culture. The world wants American culture. The biggest threat to the U.S. is cultural suicide.


The US can still remain #1, but we must work on reducing defense and acquisition costs. Eliminating all cost plus contracts is first step. The DoD must also demand that suppliers reduce costs. It is simply ridiculous that once a product is made there is no reduction through economies of scale and innovation. But reducing the overall Federal spending must be priority if we hope to contend with China. Today China is our main adversary. We are fortunate that newer high tech weapons coming to fruition. The US today is the leader high powered solid state lasers. Russia poses it''s own challenges, but they are primarily land & nuclear power. Defending Russia will be a challenge if it decides to invade Europe.

美国仍旧可以保持第一,但我们必须努力降低国防和摘购成本,排除所有合同附加成本是第一步,国防部还必须要求供应商降低成本。 一个产品都被生产出来了还不会通过规模经济和创新来降低成本,这简直太荒谬了。
如果我们期望与中国抗衡,就必须优先减少联邦政府的总体开支,今天,中国是我们的主要对手,我们很幸运,新的高科技武器即将开花结果,今天的美国是高功率固态激光器的领导者,我们有来自俄罗斯的挑战,但主要是领土和核武器, 如果俄罗斯决定入侵欧洲,保卫欧洲将是一个挑战。
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